Abstract-We study the interaction between two different types of players in the presence of uncertainty in the payoffs. In particular, we examine a scenario where there is a reward for coordinating with the players of the other type and investigate how the players behave when they interact repeatedly under a simple selection model. The recurring interactions between the players are modeled as an ergodic Markov chain that has a unique stationary distribution. We then look for equilibria on which the stationary distribution of the Markov chain will concentrate as the frequency at which players change their actions decreases. Such equilibria are called long run equilibria.
I. INTRODUCTION There are many real life situations where coordination among involved parties or players can benefit all parties. Such examples include the interactions between financial institutions that are interested in maximizing their own profits or gov ernment agencies that are interested in achieving a common goal. Similar examples also arise in engineering systems. For example, distributed engineering systems may consist of subsystems that have their own performance measures and, in order to improve the performance of all subsystems, hence that of the overall system, the subsystems may be required to coordinate their actions.
Unfortunately, it is well known that if cooperation is needed among the players to earn higher payoffs, they may fail to realize the highest payoffs for themselves. This is especially true when there is lack of trust among the players and/or uncertainty as to what actions the players may choose. Some existing literature [1] suggests that when players are unsure of the actions other players will select, risk-dominant equilibria [7] are more likely to emerge than Pareto-dominant equilibria. Furthermore, it is shown that the risk-dominant equilibrium is selected by a dynamic and evolutionary process [10] and is stochastically more stable [2] , [8] .
We study a game with two types of players that possess dif ferent preferences. Each player chooses one of two admissible actions and receives a payoff based on the actions chosen by all the players, called a strategy profile. In our game, in addition to the payoff each individual player obtains in response to the action it selects, a group of players receive an additional payoff, which we call a coordination reward, if (i) the group size exceeds a certain threshold and (ii) all the players in the group pick the same action. Therefore, the players have an incentive to coordinate among themselves to secure higher payoffs. However, due to heterogeneous preferences of the players, the players of different types may favor different equilibria. For this reason, it is not obvious which equilibrium is more likely to be chosen by the players even when the interaction among the players is repeated.
We investigated the scenario in which the payoffs of the players are given by random variables (rvs) and the players are allowed to switch their actions according to a simple selection process, based on the actions chosen by other players. We show that the equilibrium strategy profiles selected by the players most often depend on the number of players of each type, the threshold for the coordination reward, the amount of coordination reward, and the difference in the expected payoffs offered by different actions. We first derive the results for more general cases and then provide simple conditions for such equilibrium strategy profiles when the payoffs are modeled as Gaussian rvs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the basic setup and the stage game that is played repeatedly. Section III illustrates the existence of multiple Nash equilibria (NEs) of the stage game when there is no uncertainty in the payoffs of the players and motivates our study. Some of related studies in the existing literature are discussed in Section IV, followed by our main results in Section V. Simulation results are provided in Section VI to validate our findings.
II. SETUP
There are two types of players. For each i = 1,2, we denote the set of type i players by M, the number of type i players by Ni (i.e., Ni = IMI), and the total number of players by N (i.e., N = Nl + N2). Both types of players have the same action space S = {Sl,S2}.
A. Stage game
We consider the scenario where, for a fixed strategy profile of the players, a player's payoff consists of two parts. The first part is a payoff that depends solely on the player's choice of action. 1 When a type i player chooses action Sj,j E {l,2}, it receives a payoff that is given by a continuous random variable (rv) Ri , j with mean Pi , j ' Although not necessary, for simplicity of exposition, we assume that the rv Ri , j is given by Pi , j + Wi , j , where Wi , j is a zero-mean rv with a symmetric distribution, e.g., zero-mean Gaussian rv. Since the payoffs are not known in advance, this gives rise to an incomplete information game. As pointed out in [11, p. 85] , the randomness in the payoffs may be caused by various aspects of the complicated real world situations that are not modeled in the game which serves as an approximation to reality.
The second part of the payoff can be considered a reward for coordinating with other players: When a player's action is in agreement with at least 'Y . N -1 other players, where 'Y E [0,1], the player receives a positive reward of E. In other words, if'Y . N players choose the same action, say 8, all the players that choose 8 earn an additional payoff of E. Here we assume 'Y > 0.5. In this case, the payoff E may represent, for instance, the utility a player enjoys when it purchases the same product (e.g., smart phone, portable video game console, etc.) as the most of its friends. Define B := I 'Y . Nl. We assume that the means of the first part of payoffs, i.e., Pi, j, i,j E {I, 2}, satisfy the following inequalities. El. Pl,l > P2, 2 > Pl, 2; E2. P2, 2 > P2, 1 ; E3. P2, 1 + E > P2, 2 and Pl, 2 + E > Pl,l· Note that these inequalities imply that a risk neutral 2 type player (resp. type 2 player) would prefer 81 (resp. 82) if there were no coordination reward E. However, if at least B-1 other players choose 82 (resp. 81), a risk neutral type 1 player (resp. type 2 player) is better off selecting 82 (resp. 81). For example, the mean payoffs Pi,j shown in Fig. 1 satisfy the inequalities El and E2. In addition, if E > 4, inequality E3 will be met. 
B. Dynamics and strategy selection
We are interested in understanding how the players will behave when their interaction repeats indefinitely. To this end we employ the following discrete-time model for capturing the dynamic interaction among the players. At the beginning of each time tEN := {I, 2, 3, ... }, every player chooses an action from S. We denote the action picked by the k-th player of type i at time t by ai,k(t), i E {1,2} and k E {I, 2, ... ,Nd =: Ni. At time t = 1, the players choose their strategy profile according to some joint distribution Fo over S N . a) Payoffs: In order to determine the payoffs of the players at time tEN, we introduce the following array of rvs: For each tEN, we have a collection of independent and identically distributed (ij.d.) rvs W t = {W l k ; i E {I, 2} and k E Ni}, with a common distribution Qu, �here (J 2 denotes finite variance of Qu' We assume that the probability density function (PDF) gu exists, is even, and has the real number system as its support. In addition, we assume that W t , tEN, are mutually independent and let W := {w t ; tEN}.
Define n(t) := (nl(t), n2(t)), where nj(t), j E {1,2}, is the number of players that select action 8j at time t. The payoff of the k-th player of type i at time t is given by where
(1)
The term inside the parentheses on the right-hand side of (1) is the part of the payoff that depends only on the choice of the player, and the last term is the reward it receives when at least B-1 other players adopt the same action. b) Selection model: We consider a simple scenario where the players are myopic. At the beginning of time t + 1, based on the strategy profile a(t) := (ai,k(t); i E {1,2} and k E Ni) and its payoff at time t, each player decides whether to switch its action or not as follows. The player first computes the expected payoff of a player that uses the other action at time t.3 If this expected payoff is larger than its current payoff at time t, then it myopically switches its action at the beginning of time t + 1.4 Otherwise, it stays with its current action at time t + 1.
Note that because the payoffs are given by rvs, given the strategy profile a(t) at time t, each player will switch its action independently of each other at time t + 1. However, the probability with which each player will switch its action in the next time depends both on its own action at time t and on those of other players. This is a distinguishing feature of our model (different from most of the existing literature, e.g., [8] , [9] ).
III. EXISTENCE OF MULTIPLE PURE-STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIA AND LONG RUN STA BILITY
A Nash equilibrium (NE) of a game is a strategy profile a* = (a; k ; i E {l,2} and k E Ni) such that no player can do strictly better by unilaterally deviating from its equi librium strategy. However, since the payoffs in the stage game described in the previous section are given by rvs, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) is not very meaningful, and Bayesian Nash equilibria are more appropriate. Instead, let us consider the scenario with W i t k = 0 for all tEN, i E {l,2} and k E Ni, so that the payoff� are deterministic. In this case, the payoffs in (1) are given by
When the payoffs are deterministic, there are at least two (strict) PSNEs of the stage game, in which all players adopt the same action S1 or S2. We denote these PSNEs by ai = (S1, S1, · .. , sd and a2 = (S2, S2, ·· ., S2). When max{N1,N2} < e, in addition to ai and a2, there is a third PSNE in which all type 1 players use Sl and all type 2 players adopt S2. We denote this PSNE by a3.
If there are more than one PSNE as in the stage game with deterministic payoffs, it is not always obvious which PSNE is more likely to be adopted by the players. This is because the answer is often sensitive to the actions chosen by a small initial set of players. In this paper, we try to offer an answer to this question, i.e., which PSNE will be seen more often in the game we consider.
Our approach is based on the observation that fA = {a(t); tEN} is a discrete-time Markov chain (MC) [6] . Furthermore, this MC is aperiodic and positive recurrent, i.e., ergodic [6] . The fact that the MC is aperiodic is obvious because when a(t) = ai for some tEN, there is positive probability that a( t + 1) = ai. The MC is positive recurrent since the state space S N is finite. Therefore, there exists a unique stationary distribution I-L(J such that, for all a E S N , we have I:
t-1 with probability 1.
T---7 OO
T Hence, one way to determine which PSNE is visited more frequently is to look at the stationary distribution at the PSNEs and see which PSNE has the highest concentration of probability distribution around its neighborhood. Unfortunately, finding a closed-form expression for the stationary distribution I-L(J as a function of (J is often chal lenging, if possible at all, especially when N is large. Hence, comparing the long-term fraction of time the MC spends in (the neighborhood of) each of the PSNEs may not be practical. This necessitates an alternative to directly comparing the stationary distribution at the PSNEs.
When (J is sufficiently small, we can guess which set of PSNEs will be played more often by examining the asymptotic case as (J decreases to zero. We show in Section V that, as the variance (J 2 of the distribution goes to zero, under some conditions, the stationary distribution I-L(J tends to concentrate on one of the PSNEs in most cases, called a long run equilibrium.
IV. RELATED WORK
There is already a large volume of literature that examines the coordination problem among the players, called coordina tion games. Well known examples include the battle of the sexes game [4] and stag hunt game [11] . A common feature among these games is that there are more than one PSNE.
Consider a two-player game with the payoff matrix shown in Fig. 2 . In (pure) coordination games, the payoffs satisfy
Hence, the players receive a higher payoff by coordinating with each other, in which case both players receive the same payoff. In the battle of the sexes game,
Hence, the players receive a positive payoff only if they coordinate. However, player 1 prefers the PSNE (S1, sd, while player 2 favors the PSNE (S2, S2)' In the stag hunt game, the strategy Sl is to hunt a stag and S2 is to hunt a hare and the payoffs satisfy A > B ;::: D > C and a > c ;:
Hence, both players would receive a higher payoff if they could cooperate to play (S1, sd = (stag, stag). However, if there is uncertainty about whether or not the other player will cooperate, then a player may favor S2, which can be viewed as a safer choice.
A. Selection models and equilibrium selection
Since there are two PSNEs in these games, it is not immedi ately clear which PSNE the players would favor in practice. To help answer this question, researchers often turn to equilibrium selection theory [7] . Kandori et al. [8] studied the case where N players repeatedly play a symmetric coordination game, i.e., A = a, B = c, C = band D = d, among themselves. Given a strategy profile a(t) of players at time t, the payoff of a player is given by its average payoff after playing the coordination game with each of the remaining N -1 players. Then, at the beginning of time t + 1, each player selects the best reply based on the actions chosen by other players at time t with probability 1 -E and the other action with probability E. They showed that, as E ---+ 0, the unique stationary distribution of the ergodic MC {a( t); tEN} that describes the strategy profile over time concentrates on the PSNE with the risk-dominant strategy.
In another paper, Matsui and Matsuyama [10] investigated a similar problem under perfect foresight deterministic dynamics with infinite population. In their model, each player is permit ted to select/switch its action only at times given by a Poisson process with some rate ,\ > 0, and these Poisson processes are mutually independent. When a player chooses an action, it takes into account its total expected discounted payoff until the next time it will be allowed to reconsider its action. The fraction of players that use Sl at time t E R+ : = [0,00) is modeled using a differential equation. They showed that, as ,\ ---+ 00, only the risk-dominant PSNE is globally absorbing. On the other hand, if ,\ is sufficiently small, then any strict PSNE is absorbing, i.e., there exists a neighborhood around the PSNE such that, any equilibrium path from a point in the neighborhood converges to the PSNE.
Kim [9] studied the different dynamic processes of N person symmetric coordination games under the model of Matsui and Matsuyama [10] , Kandori et al. [8] , and Foster and Young [2] , and showed that all three selection criteria pick the same outcome when N = 2, but different outcomes when N ?: 3. In addition, he provided an explanation for this observation.
B. Network games
The above coordination games have been extended to net work settings, where players play the coordination games with their neighbors determined by the underlying (social) networks (e.g., [5] ). In one such example, there is a graph G = (V, E), where V is the set of vertices representing the players, and E c V x V is the set of bi-directional edges [5] . If (i, j) E E, then players i and j play a two-person coordination game. Otherwise, i and j do not interact with each other. Let N* = IVI be the number of players, and N;*, i E V, be the set of player i's neighbors, i.e.,
Each player chooses an action from {8l, 82} and, given the strategy profile of the players a = (ai; i E V) E {8l , 82} N * , the payoff of player i, denoted by Pi (a), is
where '7rl(al ,a2) is the payoff player 1 gets according to the payoff matrix in Fig. 2 when the strategy profile (aI, a2) is chosen. In other words, player i's payoff is the sum of the payoffs it obtains from playing IN;* I separate coordination games with all of its neighbors using the same action ai.
V. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we show that when a > 0 is sufficiently small, in most cases, the unique stationary distribution of the MC places most of probability on one of the PSNEs, which depends on the system parameters including the coordination reward E and the threshold ,. Here, we only consider the scenario where 8 > max{ Nl,N2} since this is the most interesting case. However, other cases can be handled in a similar fashion. For notational simplicity, with a little abuse of notation, let n ( a) = ( nl , l (a), n2 , 1 (a)), where ni , l (a) is the number of type i players selecting 81 in the strategy profile a.
We consider the following parametric scenario and examine the asymptotic case as a --+ O. and k E Nd and Uf k rv �II for all tEN, i E { l ,2} and k E M. For fixed a > 0, we assume that the rvs that model the uncertainty in the payoffs of the players are given by Wi\ = a . Uf ,k for all tEN, i E {I, 2} and k E Ni.
It is clear that W f k rv g (J by construction. Furthermore, as a diminishes, the pl�yers will switch their actions less frequently.
As defined in Section III, the unique stationary distribution of the MC for fixed a > 0 is denoted by J-L (J ' We denote the limit stationary distribution by 4 whenever the limit exists. A long run equilibrium (LRE) is defined to be a strategy profile to which J-L* assigns positive probability. We are interested in finding the set of such LREs.
Before we proceed, let us first introduce an N-dimensional mapping F : S N --+ S N , where Fi , k ( a) is the action the k th player of type i will choose at time t + 1 according to the assumed selection scheme described in Section II-B when a( t) = a and a 2 = 0, i.e., the payoffs are given by (2) . The basin of attraction of a PSNE ak, k E {I, 2, 3}, which we denote by B (ak), is defined to be B(ak) = {a E S N I lim Ft(a) = ak} .
t---+ oo
Note that the basin of attraction B(ak) is the set of strategy profiles with the property that if the players start with a strategy profile in the basin of attraction, in the absence of uncertainty in the payoffs, the strategy profile of the players will converge to the PSNE ak' One can show that, in our problem, {B(ak); k = 1,2, 3} is a partition of S N . In other words, every strategy profile belongs to the basin of attraction of exactly one PSNE.
For fixed a > 0, we define the following probabilities:
• r.l. � l -probability a type i player using 8l at time t switches its action at time t + 1 when nl(t) < 8;
• q'[ l -probability a type i player using 8l at time t switches its s ' trategy at time t + 1 when nl (t) ?: 8. One can show that qi,l < r.l. � l ' Moreover, from the inequalities El and E2, we have ql , 2 > qg , 2' r.l.� 2 > r.l.� 2 ' qg , l > ql , l ' and Sine we assume max{Nl ' N2} < 8, it is obvious that N - C-3. Cg , �/C3 , 2 � 1 and cl , d�3 ,1 ::; 1.
' ,
The following theorem provides a necessary condition for a PSNE to be an LRE. Its proof is based on Lemma 3.1 of [3, p. 177].
Theorem 1: A PSNE ak' k E {I, 2, 3}, is an LRE only if condition C-k of Assumption 1 holds.
We now provide a sufficient condition for a PSNE to be a unique LRE.
Theorem 2: Suppose that condition C-k for some k = 1,2,3, holds with 1 on the right-hand side of the inequalities replaced by 1 -E for some E > O. Then, the PSNE a;; is a unique LRE.
A. Gaussian perturbation
While Theorems 1 and 2 give us a necessary or sufficient condition for a PSNE to be an LRE, whether or not condition C-k, k E {I, 2, 3}, of Assumption 1 holds depends on the tail distribution of 91. In this subsection, we examine a special case where 90" is Gaussian(O, 0' 2 ) distribution. Define 01 = P 1, 1 -P1, 2 and 02 = P2, 2 -P2, 1 ' Under the assumption that e < min{N1,N2}' from Theorem 2 we can obtain the following: Fl. If (N2 + 1) . 02 < min{(N -e + 1) . E, (N1 + 1) . (h}, the PSNE ai is the unique LRE. F2. If (N1 + 1) '01 < min{(N -e + 1) . E, (N2 + 1) . 02}, the PSNE a2 is the unique LRE. F3. If (N -e + 1) . E < min{(N1 + 1) . 01, (N2 + 1) . 02}, the PSNE a3 is the unique LRE. The first finding (Fl) tells us that the PSNE ai is the LRE if P2, 2 -P2, 1 is sufficiently small so that type 2 players do not strongly favor 82 and/or the coordination reward E is sufficiently large to provide type 2 players with an incentive to cooperate with type 1 players. The intuition behind the second finding (F2) is similar. The third finding (F3) suggests that in order to avoid the PSNE a3 where the two different types of players play different strategies, the coordination reward E must be large enough to overcome the "efforts" necessary to cooperate. Note that the minimum coordination reward E necessary to move to one of the other two PSNEs is increasing in e.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulation results to help us visualize what goes on behind our findings in the previous section. In our simulation, we set N1 = 9 and N2 = 11. The mean payoffs are set to be
It is obvious that the inequalities in El and E2 are satisfied by the selected mean payoffs. The coordination reward is set to E = 8. With the chosen E, the inequality E3 is satisfied since P 1, 1 = 7 < P 1, 2 + E = 8 and P2, 2 = 4.5 < P2, 1 + E = 8.5.
The random perturbation in the payoffs are given by i.i.d. rvs W[ k rv Gaussian(O, 5 2 ) for all t E N, i E {1,2} and kEN;. We intentionally select large variance in relation to the mean payoffs so that the players will switch their strategies with sufficiently high probability and, hence, the MC will move between different PSNEs during the duration of the simulation. For this reason, the stationary distribution will not be concentrated at one of the PSNEs. Instead, much of the probability would be concentrated in the neighborhood near the PSNE predicted by our result.
At time t = 1, the players choose action 81 or 82 with equal probability of 0.5, independently of each other. We run the simulation for T = 10 6 periods. Here, we look at two different scenarios that satisfy the conditions in the findings Fl and F3 in subsection V-A by varying the coordination threshold ,. Number of players employing strategy s1 Fig. 4 . Plot of iJ,( e) (-y = 0.7 and E = 8).
Number of type 1 players employing strategy S1
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Number of type 2 players employing strategy s 1 . i. One can easily verify that the employed parameters satisfy the conditions in the finding Fl in subsection V-A. Hence, our finding F 1 predicts that much of stationary distribution will be concentrated in the neighborhood of the PSNE ai . Indeed, this can be seen from Figs. 4 and 5. These figures also indicate that the players indeed deviate from the PSNE ai and spend some time in the neighborhood of the PSNE a3 . However, since c2" , 3 < C3 , 2' the MC rarely visits the PSNE a2 as evident from Fig. 4 . Case 2: , = 0.8 -In the second example, we increase the coordination threshold , to 0.8. We can easily verify that the conditions in the finding F3 are met in this case. As shown in Fig. 6 , with higher threshold " it becomes more difficult for type 1 players to keep type 2 players to maintain the cooperation necessary for the PSNE ai . This is because when enough type 2 players adopt 81 at some time t, which is easier with higher threshold, and the rest of type 2 players do not receive the coordination reward E any more, many of type 2 players using action 81 at time t will switch to 82 in the following time according to the assumed selection model, making cooperation more difficult. As a result, the players spend much of the time in the neighborhood of the PSNE a2 as illustrated by Figs. 6 and 7 . Number of players employing strategy s1 VII. CONCLUSION We studied a game where two different types of players possessing heterogeneous preferences can benefit from coop eration among themselves so as to coordinate their actions. We showed that when the payoffs of the players are given 6 by i.i.d. rvs, the evolution of the strategy profile can be modeled as a discrete-time ergodic Markov chain, which has a unique stationary distribution. Based on this observation, we examined the long run equilibria by allowing the uncertainty in the payoffs to decrease. We derived a necessary condition and a sufficient condition for a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the stage game with deterministic payoffs to be a long run equilibrium. Using the sufficient condition for general cases, we also derived simple conditions for different pure-strategy Nash equilibria to be long run equilibria when the payoffs are given by Gaussian random variables.
